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I. INTRODUCTION
As California's population has risen over the past several years,
so has the need for homes. Contractors and developers have worked
diligently to fill that need. Unfortunately, hasty builders have been
more concerned with the quantity of the homes they construct, rather
than the quality. As a result, thousands of homeowners across
California find themselves living in damaged, but not always dan-
gerous, quarters.
By the time a homeowner realizes that her home is damaged, most
contractors and/or developers are judgment proof or protected by
statutes of limitations.' Left with no other alternatives, unhappy
homeowners are now, more than ever, turning to their insurers to
obtain the necessary funds to effect proper repairs.
Normally, the damage to an insured's home is concurrently caused
by a conjunction of third-party negligence, earth movement and/or
land subsidence. The damage to the home is usually in the form of
cracked slabs and foundations causing damage to the interior of the
home as well. What is commonly thought of as simple "settlement
cracks" may be evidence of serious deficiencies in the foundation or
underlying soils of the home. Third-party negligence can be any one
of numerous errors by the contractor, soils engineer, developer and/
or design professional, such as (1) negligent construction, (2) negligent
or poor design, (3) use of substandard fill material, (4) negligent
compaction of the soil, (5) defective work, (6) poor framing of the
home, and (7) improper grading of the land. For purposes of this
article, this type of damage and the subsequent losses will be referred
to as "subsidence losses."
A normal homeowner would have one of the two basic types of
homeowner's insurance policies: (1) Specified peril, or (2) "all-risk."
1. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
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In a specified peril policy, the insurer and insured determine precisely
which risks will be insured and set the premium payments accordingly.
Thus, the reasonable expectations of the parties are set. The insurer
can specify the risks it is willing to insure and the insured can
purchase coverage for the perils against which she wants protection.
For example, neither party would expect the insurer to pay for a
theft under a policy which only covers fire.
The "all-risk" policy was a brain-child of the 1950s. In an "all-
risk" policy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered.2
This is the broadest form of coverage and has been so interpreted
by the courts. In an "all-risk" policy, the reasonable expectation of
the insured is that the insurer will pay for all losses caused by a
non-excluded peril.3 In other words, the insured expects that she will
be paid for any damage occurring to her home unless the damage
fits into one of the handful of policy exclusions. Controversies arise
because the insurer fails to provide for situations in which the
insured's loss is caused by more than one peril. This is called the
doctrine of multiple cause or concurrent proximate cause.
4
Under California law, if the damage is concurrently caused by an
excluded peril (such as earth movement) and a non-excluded peril
(such as third-party negligence), the claim is covered under the "all
risks of physical loss" homeowner's policy.' Insurance carriers have
taken the position that coverage for such losses can only be afforded
to the insured if the non-excluded cause of the loss is the moving or
independent cause of the loss. Viewing all subsidence claims as earth
movement, the insurer's position in a multiple causation loss is that
an excluded peril's enhancement of the loss destroys coverage even
if the other causes of the loss were non-excluded perils. Since earth
movement, an excluded peril, always aggravates a subsidence loss,
2. This article will concentrate on the "all-risk" policy.
3. See Wolf Mach. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 133 Cal. App. 3d 324, 183 Cal. Rptr.
695 (1982).
4. Cf. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530, 532 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988).
5. The standard policy is the HO-3 edition policy written by the Insurance Services
Organization ("ISO"), whose purpose is to standardize policies and forms for the insurance
industry. The HO-3 policy can be separated into "Old language" and "New language"
(colloquial terms used by lawyers, referred to as "dirt lawyers" by their colleagues who practice
in this area). "Old language" is defimed as homeowner's policies which were in effect prior
to 1983/84, when third party negligence was added as an additional exclusion to the policy.
Policies in effect after 1983/84 are referred to as "New language." Because insurance companies
claim that the HO-3 edition homeowner's insurance policy is a trade secret, a copy cannot be
obtained. However, it is the basis of all homeowner's insurance policies issued by all insurers.
Existing homeowner's policies provide examples of the variations of the standard form.
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this forces denial of virtually all subsidence claims. Recently, in light
of court decisions finding coverage contrary to the insurer's position, 6
insurers have relied more on the technical notice provisions in the
policy to defeat and deny claims. 7
The insurer's position seems difficult to defend in light of black
letter California law which establishes that: (1) ambiguities in the
policy are interpreted against the insurer,8 (2) policy exclusions are
interpreted narrowly, 9 and (3) coverage is viewed as broadly as
possible.10 The rule proposed by insurers would give them an unfair
advantage over the insured in a subsidence claim where the loss
occurred because of multiple causes. Since almost all subsidence
losses are concurrently caused by earth movement or flood (excluded
perils) in conjunction with a non-excluded peril (i.e., some sort of
third-party negligence), the insurer would almost never have to pay
for such a loss. This rule is contrary to California case law,1' the
California Insurance Code,1 2 and the reasonable expectation of the
insureds who are told, when purchasing their policy, that they are
buying all inclusive, all risk coverage.
Insurers use several justifications for denying subsidence claims.
One or more of those justifications are usually used per claim.
However, each has its weakness.
The earth movement exclusion is ineffective where the loss is
proximately caused, in part, by a non-excluded peril, such as third-
party negligence. Almost all policies contain a twelve month "notice
of loss" provision. Here, the insurance adjuster-rarely an expert in
soils geology-determines a date when she thinks the insured should
have noticed the loss, or when the insured first noticed a crack in
the driveway, and attaches that date to the loss. Then, the adjuster
denies the claim because the insurer was not notified within twelve
6. See infra notes 19-76 and accompanying text (section II of this article discusses court
decisions expanding coverage despite exclusionary clauses).
7. See infra notes 77-104 and accompanying text (section IV of this article explores
notice provisions and statutes of limitation).
8. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 430, 296 P.2d
801, 805 (1956).
9. See, e.g., Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 399, 154 P.2d 399 (1944)
(court did not allow defendant to use the statute of limitations defense for equitable reasons).
10. See Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 731, 747, 117 P.2d
661, 669 (1941).
11. See infra notes 19-76 and accompanying text (section II of this article discusses court
decisions expanding coverage).
12. Cf. CAL. INs. CODE §§ 530, 532 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988).
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months of that date. Under the "discovery of loss" rule,13 this twelve
month limitation does not begin to run until the insured discovers
the damage and its cause-usually after an expert performs the
appropriate testing on the property. This limitation, and the others
to follow, ignore a well-established body of law on continuing losses
and the fact that, until repaired, no "occurrence" date exists.
14
The insurer generally uses the twelve month "suit against us"
provision in the same manner as the twelve month "notice of loss"
provision, except that the insurer claims that the insured failed to
sue within the prescribed limitation."s
Also similar is the sixty day proof of loss requirement. Insurers
deny claims based on the failure of the insured to file a proof of
loss within sixty days. The sixty days is calculated on a backdate
basis like the twelve month notice provisions. This ignores the fact
that the sixty days does not begin to run until the investigation
determining the full extent of the damages has been completed.
16
Insurers also rely on the four year statute of limitation for breach
of the contract. If the adjuster's determination of the date of loss is
more than four years prior to the claim, the insurer denies on this
basis as well.
Finally, in 1983 and 1984, all insurers rewrote their homeowner's
policies to exclude damage concurrently or proximately caused by
third-party negligence. The policies are commonly referred to as
"New Language." Ignoring case law that would requir6 the insurer
to apply the language of the first policy issued,17 the insurer cites
the new language as a basis for denying the claim.' s
This article has two objectives: (1) Establishing that subsidence-
type losses are covered under the express "all-risk" (HO-3 Edition)
13. See infra notes 125-47 and accompanying text (section IV-B of this article discusses
the "discovery of loss" rule).
14. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. General Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1960); California
Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983);
Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1962);
Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1962).
15. The ISO Homeowner's, HO-3 Edition, policy contains a provision which states: SUIT
AGAINST US. No action can be brought unless the policy provisions have been complied
with and the action is started within one year after the date of loss.
16. Cf. Associated Eng'rs Inc. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 352, 353
(1959) (recognizing that an "all risk" policy is unique because coverage attaches upon the
fortuitous and extraneous happening of loss or damage from any cause whatsoever, unless
specifically excluded).
17. If the first policy is issued prior to 1983, the "old language" policy is applicable. See
supra note 5.
18. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
homeowner's insurance policy; and (2) showing that the positions
taken by insurers to deny claims under this type of policy are contrary
to established case law. To accomplish these objectives, this article
will explore the following: (1) Coverage issues, including, but not
limited to, new language; (2) risk bearing; and (3) the notice provi-
sions in typical homeowner's insurance policies.
II. COVERAGE-DEFEATING THE EARTH MOVEMENT AND FLOOD
EXCLUSIONS
In a typical disputed subsidence claim, the insured makes a claim
under the homeowner's policy on the theory that she has suffered a
continuing loss19 to her home proximately caused by a concurrence
of third-party negligence (by the developer, contractor, design pro-
fessional, etc.) in conjunction with earth movement or flood.20 Three
lines of authority contribute to the present state of California law:
(1) The doctrine that a policy exclusion is only applicable if the
excluded peril is the efficient, primary and proximate cause of the
loss;21 (2) the concept of negligence as an insured peril in an "all
risk" policy where various forms of third-party negligence or the
insured's negligence is a covered risk of loss, absent a specific
exclusion;22 and (3) the concurrent causation doctrine-that there can
be more than one proximate cause of any event-which dictates that
if two distinct causes interact at the same time to produce the given
result, one of which is a covered peril, there will be coverage. 23
19. See infra notes 105-156 and accompanying text (discussing the "date of loss" and
"continuing loss" issues).
20. The landmark case of Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal.2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr.
689 (1963) established this principle, affirmed and applied in Sauer v. General Insurance Co.,
225 Cal. App. 2d 275, 278, 37 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305-6 (1964), and Gillis v. Sun Insurance Office
Limited, 238 Cal. App. 2d 408, 415-24, 47 Cal. Rptr. 868, 872-78 (1965). See also State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973);
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing the doctrine of concurrent
proximate causation).
21. See Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal.2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
22. See Associated Eng'rs, Inc. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 175 F.2d 352, 353 (N.D. Cal.
1959); Premier Ins. Co. v. Welsh, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 722, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661 (1983).
23. See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1962); Wagner v. Director,
658 F. Supp. 1530 (C.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 847 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1988);
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Ca.3d 94, 514 P.2d. 123, 109 Cal. Rptr.
811 (1973); Cypress Grove Townhouse Project Comm. v. Covenant Mutual Ins. Co., 197 Cal.
App. 3d 169, 242 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1987) (Pursuant to California Rules of Court sections 976(b)
and 976.1, the California Supreme Court has ordered the Cypress Grove opinion depublished.
As a result, the case cannot be cited as authority in California courts.); Strubble v. United
1989 / Insurance For Subsidence Damages
California cases have construed the "all risk" language contained
in most homeowner's and homeowner association's insurance policies
to allow recovery for property damage where none was apparently
ever intended. 24 Recent policy language changes have restricted cov-
erage, excluding losses concurrently caused by third-party negligence.
Thus, if damage occurred during the policy period of older, less
restrictive policies, those provisions may afford coverage. The three
emergent lines of authority will now be fully explored.
A. Primary, Efficient Cause as Basis for Coverage
The primary efficient cause doctrine was first enumerated by the
California Supreme Court in Sabella v. Wisler.25 In Sabella, improper
lot preparation caused a sewer line to break. The leaking resulted in
lot subsidence and subsequent damage to plaintiffs' home.
In 1955, Wisler constructed the Sabella house over a quarry pit.
The pit had been improperly filled and then sold to Sabella, who
failed to conduct an independent soil inspection. In May 1957,
National Union Fire Insurance Company issued an "all physical
loss" policy to the Sabellas, agreeing to insure the house against all
risks of physical loss except for specific exceptions, including losses
caused by settling, cracking, shrinking, expansion of pavements,
foundations, walls, floors or ceilings.
The trial court found that, while no damage occurred until May
1, 1959, sometime between November of 1958 and February of 1959,
a sewer pipe began to leak near the house. The sewer outflow from
the house infiltrated the unstable earth below the foundation, causing
the house to settle to uneven elevations. Its foundations and walls
cracked, its floors became out of level, and its doors and windows
jammed-subsidence ranged from two to six inches.
Services Auto. Ass'n, 35 Cal. App. 3d 498, 110 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1973). The depublished cases
discussed in this article (with the exception of American Star Ins. Co. v. American Employees
Ins. Co., 210 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985)) were affirmed and ordered depublished after the Supreme
Court accepted Garvey for review. (Pursuant to California Rules of Court sections 976(b) and
976.1, the California Supreme Court has ordered the Garvey opinion depublished. As a result,
the case cannot be cited as authority in California Courts.). These cases remain illustrative of
the courts' current reasoning in subsidence cases.
24. See infra notes 52-4 and accompanying text. While this article is replete with cases
involving single family homeowner's policies, it applies with equal vigor to property damage
losses in condominiums, planned developments and common interest subdivisions. See Cypress
Grove, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 169, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 708. See supra note 23 (Cypress Grove has
been ordered depublished by the California Supreme Court).
25. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
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The court found the reasonable value of plaintiffs' home to be
$18,200 undamaged, but the reasonable fair market value in the
damaged condition to be only $10,000.26 The Supreme Court recited:
In determining whether a loss is within an exception in a policy,
where there is a concurrence of different causes, the efficient
cause-the one that sets others in motion-is the cause to which
the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may follow it,
and operate more immediately in producing the disaster. The virtual
absence of subsidence damage in the prior four years of the existence
of the house here in question clearly indicates that the broken pipe
was the predominating or moving efficient cause of the loss.27
Rebuffing the insurer's argument that the loss was unfortuitous
and not a "risk," the Sabella court relied upon Snapp v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Company,2 where the court said:
After any movement of land has occurred, it might be said to have
been 'inevitable' with semantic correctness, but such 'inevitability'
does not alter the fact that at the time the contract of insurance
was entered into, the event was only a contingency or risk that
might or might not occur within the term of the policy. Moreover,
the breaking of the sewer pipe and consequent induction of quan-
tities of waste water into improperly compacted fill may be viewed
as an unanticipated external event or casualty, operating to trigger
the greatly accelerated action of possibly inherent vices.29
Sabella was followed by and applied in Sauer v. General Ins. Co. ,3o
where the insurer alleged a lack of coverage under the "all risk"
homeowners policy for foundation, wall, floor, and other damage
from saturation and settlement of soils. 3' General Insurance Company
claimed they were insulated from liability by exclusions against "earth
movement," "water damage," and "settling and cracking." The
court found that the plaintiffs' property damage resulted from leaky
water pipes beneath their house. 3 Following Sabella, the Sauer court
held that coverage existed since the efficient, proximate cause of the
loss was the broken water pipe, an included peril.
33
26. Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at 26, 377 P.2d at 892, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
27. Id. at 31-2, 377 P.2d at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (citing 6 G. COUCH, INSURANCE §
1466 (1930)). See 6 G. COUCH, INSURANCE § 1463 (1930).
28. 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 830, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44, 45-46 (1963).
29. Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at 34, 377 P.2d at 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 697, (citing Snapp v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 206 Cal. App. 2d 327, 330, 24 Cal, Rptr. 44, 45-46 (1962)).
30. 225 Cal. App. 2d 275, 37 Cal. Rptr 303 (1964).
31. Sauer, 225 Cal. App. 2d at 276, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
32. Id. at 278, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
33. Id. at 279, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 304. See also Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co., 199 Cal.
790
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Thus, under Sabella, the moving, efficient cause of the loss, if an
included peril, would give rise to coverage. However, courts began
to expand this doctrine.
B. Extending Dominant, Efficient and Proximate Causes
Soon after Sabella was decided, courts began to loosen the moving,
efficient cause doctrine (i.e., the first link in the causation chain
must be an included peril for coverage to be afforded) and began to
rely more on whether the "dominant" cause, no matter which link,
was an included peril.
In Gillis v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. ,4 a storm destroyed the
insured's boat dock. The carrier argued the loss was caused by water
action and waves, an excluded peril. However, the court, following
Sabella and Sauer, found one of the causes was the windstorm, an
included risk. 35 The wind caused a gangway to break loose, damaging
a pontoon which kept the dock afloat. The court found that the
original damage was caused by the gangway when it struck the dock.
The loss arose from the windstorm. The court, finding coverage,
held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court's
finding that the windstorm was the dominant and efficient cause of
the damage and loss.
36
Gillis was followed by Strubble v. United Services Automobile
Association,37 which involved a claim under an "all risk" insurance
policy. The carrier alleged that the earth movement exclusion pre-
vailed despite earthquake coverage.3 8 In 1967, an earthquake led to
discovery of a landslide under the plaintiffs' 7,280 square foot
panoramic ocean view estate. In 1968, the plaintiffs moved out as
the landslide worsened, leaving only one-third of the house intact.
When the carrier denied coverage, the Strubbles sued claiming an
earthquake, an included coverage, triggered the landslide. The court
held the efficient cause of the landslide was the included peril of an
earthquake operating through the excluded peril of earth movement.
39
App. 2d 239, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1962) (coverage found when subsidence damage was caused
by rain, an included peril, concurrently with rainwater infiltration, an excluded peril).
34. 238 Cal. App. 2d 408, 47 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1965).
35. Gillis, 238 Cal. App. 2d at 420, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
36. Id. at 424, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
37. 35 Cal. App. 3d 498, 110 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1973).
38. Strubble, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 504, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
39. Id. at 505, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
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Gillis and Strubble commenced the trend by courts to expand
coverage when the included peril, working concurrently with an
excluded peril, was the efficient cause of the damages. Gillis and
Strubble were simply premonitions of what was to come. The con-
current cause doctrine first espoused by Sabella, had not yet com-
pleted its metamorphasis, as explained below.
C. Concurrent Causation Expands Sabella
The ambiguity in the efficient, dominant cause approach is that it
is not always possible to determine which cause is the efficient,
moving or dominant cause of the loss. Usually, the causes are
concurrent-i.e., they happen simultaneously. This issue finally reached
the California Supreme Court ten years after Sabella, in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge.° The court held that
where one of a loss' two concurrent causes is an included peril,
coverage is afforded.
41
The insured in Partridge was covered under a homeowner's policy
and an automobile policy, both issued by State Farm. The home-
owner's policy, however, contained an exclusion for injuries arising
out of "the use of an automobile." The trial court found the insured
was negligent in driving his car off a paved road onto rough terrain,
causing a concealed magnum pistol to discharge and injure his
passenger.42 The insured had modified the gun to give it a "hair
trigger action," which the court found negligent and independent of
any "use" of the car.
43
The question presented was whether there was coverage under the
homeowner's policy for the insured's negligent acts in modifying the
gun." The California Supreme Court, in finding the loss covered,
stated:
Although there may be some question whether either of the two
causes in the instant case can be properly characterized as the
'prime', 'moving' or 'efficient' cause of the accident, we believe
that the coverage under a liability insurance policy is equally avail-
40. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal: Rptr. 811 (1973).
41. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 94, 102, 514 P.2d at 123, 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 811, 817.
42. Id. at 99, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
43. Id. at 100, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
44. Id. at 103, 514 P.2d at 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
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able to an insured whenever an insured risk constitutes simply a
concurrent proximate cause of the 'injuries.' 45
Partridge became the leading case on multiple causation losses.
Although Partridge dealt with physical damage to a person, its
holding equally applies to property losses under similar "all-risk"
homeowner's policies. Thus, Partridge was bootstrapped as applying
to all concurrent losses occurring under the all-risk homeowner's
policy. The following section discusses some of those cases as they
were applied to "all-risk" homeowner's policies.
D. Elimination of Prime Causes and Finding Coverage for Any
Third Party Negligence
After Partridge, courts began to apply the concurrent proximate
cause doctrine to homeowner subsidence losses. Safeco Insurance
Company v. Guyton46 interpreted California law and found coverage
under "all-risk" homeowner's policies issued by various insurance
companies to residents of Palm Desert, California. 47
Record rains in 1976, accompanied by Hurricane Kathleen, over-
flowed flood control facilities and inundated parts of Palm Desert
with water. Appellants in this case were property owners who suffered
extensive property damage from those flood waters.
Safeco's policies included standard exclusions for losses arising or
resulting from, contributed to, or aggravated by "flood, surface
water, waves, tidal-water or overflow of streams or other bodies of
water. ' 4 Relying on this exclusion, Safeco denied the claims and
brought a declaratory relief action.49 Following Partridge, the court
held that whenever an included peril constitutes simply a concurrent
proximate cause of the damages, coverage exists, even though the
excluded peril preceded the included peril. 50 Thus, even though the
failure of the flood control structures (the excluded peril) preceded
the negligent construction of the flood control devices (the included
peril), the court found coverage because the negligent construction
was a concurrent proximate cause.
51
45. Id. at 104-05, 514 P.2d at 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (emphasis in original).
46. 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982).
47. Guyton, 692 F.2d at 555.
48. Id. at 553.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 554-55.
51. Id. at 555.
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The Partridge court had expanded the coverage available to home-
owners by doing away with the Sabella court's preoccupation with
finding that the included peril need be the "prime," "moving," or
"efficient" cause of the loss or damage.5 2 Both Partridge and Guyton
expanded Sabella by requiring that the insured only prove an insured
risk constitutes a concurrent proximate cause of the damages instead
of the prime, moving or efficient cause. This interpretation construed
the policies' exclusions narrowly, to the insurer's chagrin. Instead of
allowing the insurer to deny multiple causation claims whenever an
excluded peril aided in the loss, the court, consistent with the theory
behind proximate causation53 and the reasonable expectation of the
insured who purchased an "all-risk" policy, required the insurer to
pay for all losses that were proximately caused, in whole or part, by
a non-excluded peril.
Another example of a situation where the court has found coverage
where an excluded and an included peril gave rise to a loss is Hughes
v. Potomac Insurance Company.54 There, the court found the infil-
tration of rainwater, an excluded peril, and rain, an included peril,
caused a rise in the groundwater which contributed to a landslide,
leaving the insured's house precariously perched over a cliff." The
insurance carrier asserted as a defense that its policy covered the
insured's structure and foundations, but not the soil or land under-
neath the building.5 6 The policy language insured against all physical
losses to the "dwelling." Finding ambiguity in the word "dwelling,"
the court held that the insured's dwelling suffered real and severe
damage when the soil beneath it slid away and left it overhanging a
thirty-foot cliff.5 7 The court said that until the damage was repaired
and the land beneath the building stabilized, the structure "could
scarcely be considered a 'dwelling building' in the sense that rational
persons would be content to reside there.58 Coverage was granted.
52. Id. at 554-555 (citing State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94,
104-05, 514 P.2d 123, 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 818 (1973)).
53. Cf. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530, 532 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988).
54. 199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1962).
55. Hughes, 199 Cal. App. 2d at 244-5, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 652-3.
56. Id. at 245, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
57. Id. at 249, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
58. Id. Accord Pfeiffer v. General Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1960). In
Pfeiffer, plaintiffs' home had been damaged by a landslide. In addition, the land beneath the
house needed stabilization repairs. The court held that:
In the case at bar, it is manifest that the land underlying the house must be
encompassed within the word 'dwelling' unless the policy is .to be interpreted as
illusory. It appears to this court, and the court finds, that no amount of repairs to
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Although not confronted with a homeowner's policy but a con-
tractor's "all risk" policy, the District Court in Associated Engineers,
Inc. v. American National Fire Insurance Company59 recognized that
an "all risk" policy is a unique insurance policy because it does not
specify the events which must cause damage before coverage at-
tachesA0 It is, according to the court, "a promise to pay upon the
fortuitous and extraneous happening of loss or damage from any
cause whatsoever," unless excluded. 61 The negligence of the contrac-
tor was found to be such an event since "the risk of negligence does
not come within any exception to the policy and therefore it is an
insured peril."
'62
As awareness of subsidence damage among homeowners has in-
creased, the California courts have been inundated with subsidence
claims in the past few years. In Premier Insurance Company v.
Welsh,63 the insurer brought a declaratory relief action under an "all
risk" homeowners insurance policy.64 A landslide destroyed the Welsh
home after heavy rains. The trial court concluded that the primary
and efficient cause of the landslide was heavy precipitation, an
excluded peril, rather than a negligently maintained subdraln, a
covered risk.
65
Following Sabella, the Court of Appeal reversed, maintaining that
the moving or efficient cause of the loss was the negligently main-
tained subdrain rather than the rainfall 6 More significantly, follow-
ing Partridge and Guyton, the court held the damaged subdrain was,
at the very least, a concurrent proximate cause of the property loss
incurred by the insureds which, alone, gave rise to the insurer's
liability.67 The court stated:
In the instant case, the causal sequence leading up to the loss of
appellants' house began with the negligent installation of the sewer
line in 1972. This damaged the subdrain underlying appellants'
the present structure alone will cure the damage or replace the dwelling until the
earth movement under the structure is stabilized.
Id. at 608. See Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (1962) (relying on Pfeiffer).
59. 175 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
60. Associated Engrs, Inc., 175 F. Supp. at 353.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 353-54.
63. 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983).
64. Premier, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 722, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
65. Id. at 723, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 659.
66. Id. at 725, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 660.
67. Id. at 727, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 661.
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property by impeding its capacity to release subsurface waters....
While it is true that the heavy rainfall was the first link in the
causal sequence, the immediate or proximate cause of loss was the
damage to the drain which set in motion the chain of events leading
to the ultimate destruction of the dwelling. It is a well settled
principle of law that the proximate cause is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient inter-
vening cause, produced the injury or damage complained of and
without which such injury or damage would not have occurred. 68
Turning to the concurrent causation approach as an independent
basis for reversal, the court held the damaged subdrain was a
concurrent proximate cause of the property loss. 69 Citing Partridge
and Guyton, the court continued:
Since in the instant case the stipulated facts explicitly state that the
earth slide resulting in the destruction of the dwelling would not
have occurred if the subdrain had not been damaged, it is established
as a matter of law that the damage to the drain was a concurrent
proximate cause of the loss. This, of course, compells the conclusion
that the judgment at bench must be reversed under the State Farm
and Safeco rationale as well. 70
The Partridge rationale, however, has been brought before the
California Supreme Court in Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company.71 In Garvey, a San Francisco law professor took his
homeowners insurance carrier to court when it refused to pay for
property damage under the "all risk" insurance policy. 72 The Garveys
lived in a sixty-year-old hillside home. In 1960, they added a bedroom
and deck. In August, 1978, the bedroom addition physically separated
from the rest of the house. During repairs of the addition, they
68. Id. at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 660 (citing Parker v. City and County of San Francisco,
158 Cal. App. 2d 597 (1958)).
69. Id. at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
70. Id. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1985) (coverage under all risk homeowner's policy affirmed since a concurrent cause of the
damage was an included peril); Cypress Grove Townhouse Project Comm. v. Covenant Mutual
Ins. Co., 197 Cal. App. 3d 197, 242 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1987) (sand dunes working as a natural
barrier to protect condominium project were eroded by waves; held, coverage under all risk
policy; insurer required to repair barriers as well as damage to project). See supra note 23
(Cypress Grove has been ordered depublished by the California Supreme Court). Both Adams
and Cypress Grove followed the Partridge rationale.
71. 227 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1986), vacated and rev. granted, 723 P.2d 1248, 229 Cal. Rptr.
663 (1986) (Pursuant to California Rules of Court sections 976(b) and 976.1 the California
Supreme Court has ordered the Garvey opinion depublished. As a result the case cannot be
cited as authority in California courts.). This case has abeen reprinted without change at 201
Cal. App. 3d 1174 to permit tracking pending review by the California Supreme Court.
72. Garvey, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
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learned that the addition was built without footings or structural
connections to the house. The Garveys filed a claim and State Farm
denied coverage relying on the earth movement exclusion. 7
Seven months after the loss, State Farm offered to pay the $11,500
damages under an agreement with plaintiffs that they "hold" the
money while State Farm pursued its declaratory relief action to
judgment. If State Farm prevailed, the Garveys were to return the
money. Plaintiffs were also required to waive all rights to sue for
bad faith. The Garveys refused the tender and filed suit against State
Farm for bad faith.
Relying on Partridge, the trial judge granted a directed verdict on
the coverage issue because third-party negligence, a non-excluded
peril, was a proximate cause of the loss. 7 4 The appellate court
reversed, claiming that the jury must decide the coverage issue.75 In
a rather bizarre and complex opinion, the appellate court concluded:
the question of which category the present case falls into was a
matter for the jury to decide. It may be that the loss was due to
the fact that the covered risk (negligent construction of the house
addition) was dependent on the excluded risk (earth movement). In
other words, if the negligently constructed house addition was the
agency through which the earth movement caused the loss, then
coverage would be denied under Sabella. On the other hand, if the
house addition was negligently constructed such that the addition
is what caused the earth to move with the resulting loss, then
coverage exists. Finally, if the earth was caused to move independent
of the house addition and the addition was tearing away from the
house independent of the earth movement, with the two happening
to join together to cause the loss, then coverage exists.
76
The Supreme Court has heard oral argument on the Garvey case
twice, the last time in September, 1987. For over two and one half
years, the Supreme Court has failed to render an opinion.
The Supreme Court can rule upon Garvey in one of three ways,
each having different ramifications: (1) the trial court ruling can be
upheld, strengthening Partridge and making all subsidence claims
caused by a conjunction of an excluded and non-excluded peril
covered; (2) the Court of Appeal could be affirmed, reviving the
Sabella line of reasoning and changing the homeowner's burden of
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 211, 219.
76. Id. at 219.
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proof; or (3) the Supreme Court can remand for a new trial rendering
the appellate court's opinion meaningless. Guidance from the Court
is needed to solve this conflict in authority.
III. NEw LANGUAGE AND BEARING THE RISK OF Loss
A. New Language
The case authority discussed above has forced homeowners' insur-
ance carriers to extend coverage to losses which they never intended
to cover. Some insurance carriers reacted in 1983 by amending the
language in standard homeowner's/homeowner association policies.
In an effort to negate the concurrent causation doctrine, policy
exclusions were rewritten to apply "regardless of any other cause or
event contributing concurrently or in any sequence of the loss." In
some instances, the word "all" has been excised from "all risk" and
a newly expanded exclusion for "faulty workmanship, design and
materials" is now frequently seen. The new language was specifically
developed by insurers as a response to the California cases diluting
traditional exclusions in "all risk" policies.
One court has held that evidence of the way a policy exclusion
has been rewritten or revised for clarification or amplification has
been held to be irrelevant where the loss occurred solely in the old
policy period.77 Thus, old language would still apply if the loss began
prior to the policy changes in 1983-84.
Despite these policy revisions, attorneys, backed by the courts'
historical tendency to find coverage, continue to apply existing case
law to circumvent exclusionary language. Furthermore, all damage
which occurred-or manifested-prior to the inception date of the
new policies, will continue to be interpreted under the old policy
language. As discussed in more detail below, attorneys and carriers
will be confronted with the "continuing and progressive" property
damage claims which may give rise to coverage under the old and
new policies. The insureds and their attorneys will be relying on the
old "all risk" concurrent causation analysis while the carriers and
their counsel will be asserting the new language as a defense.
77. McKee v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 772, 777-78, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 745, 748 (1983).
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B. Spreading and Bearing the Risk
The insurance industry, in response to this legal trend, is tempo-
rarily seeking to minimize its losses through subrogation efforts
against developers or by involving other insurance companies who
issued policies during periods of continuing damage, particularly earth
movement damage. California Union Insurance Company v. Land-
mark Insurance Company 8 discusses the subrogation issue among
insurers. California Union, involving liability policies, concluded that
where two or more insurance companies are on the risk during a
period of continuous, progressive and deteriorating property damage,
each carrier is jointly and severally liable.79 The carrier on the risk
when damage first occurs continues on the risk even after the policy
period ends. 0
Dirt lawyers81 have extended the California Union rationale to
homeowners' policies. The common consumer practice of shopping
for the least expensive coverage may actually help homeowners find
themselves in the enviable position of having two or more insurance
companies on the risk. This practice will also free carriers, on the
risk at the time the claim is made, to look to prior and subsequent
carriers to spread the risk.
Recently, the courts have struggled with the question of liability
of a continuous loss on multiple insurers. In American Star Insurance
Company. v. American Employers Insurance Company,82 the insur-
ance carrier for a gas pipe contractor brought a declaratory relief
action against all other previous carriers for indemnification.8 3 After
holding that the damage caused by the defective pipe was continuous,
yet one "occurrence" within the meaning of the policies' language,
the court required all insurers to share in the loss pro rata.8 4 The
court reasoned:
Two facts are crucial to this determination. The first is the cause
of the damage: the pipes were defectively manufactured. The re-
78. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
79. California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
80. Id. at 474, 476, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 468, 469.
81. See supra note 5.
82. 210 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985) (Pursuant to California Rules of Court sections 976(b) and
976.1, the California Supreme Court has ordered the American Star opinion depublished. As
a result the case cannot be cited as authority in California courts.).
83. American Star, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 836-37.
84. 210 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
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suiting damage was, in a very real sense, preordained from the time
the pipes were installed. And the source of the problem leads to
the second crucial fact: damage occurred during each policy period.
It was occurring from the time the pipes were installed and placed
in use. This was a continuous degenerative condition. In our view,
under these circumstances, it would be arbitrary to select some finite
point, or points, to fix liability."
Three years later, in the same appellate district, the court disagreed
with California Union and the unpublished American Star analysis
in Home Insurance Company v. Landmark Insurance Company.6 In
Home Insurance, based on stipulated facts between two insurers
arguing over which company must bear the loss, the court held that
"in situations involving continiting damage after the policy has
expired, the insurer on the risk at the time the damage was first
discovered is liable for the entire loss." ' 87 Realizing that this is contrary
to well established principles, the court, in February, 1988, granted
a rehearing.
A slew of attorneys then joined in the case as amicus and the case
reappeared in November, 1988.88 Although Home Insurance specifi-
cally disapproved of the California Union case,89 the court also rightly
realized that the Home Insurance case must be limited to its stipulated
facts:
... we hold that as between two first-party insurers, one of which
is on the risk on the date of the first manifestation of property
damage, and the other on the risk after the date of the first
manifestation of damage, the first insurer must pay the entire claim.
We wish to stress that our holding is limited to the stipulated facts
before us.90
Home Insurance threw a wrench into the law as it presently stands.
If it can be established that a covered risk resulted in continuing and
progressive property damage over a period of three years while three
separate carriers insured the homeowner, the carriers are jointly and
severally liable for the loss under California Union. The carriers,
then, would be in a position to involve all three insurance carriers
on a negotiable proportional basis. However, under the Home In-
85. 210 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (emphasis in original).
86. 197 Cal. App. 3d 954, 243 Cal. Rptr. 202, 205 (1988).
87. Home Insurance, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 958, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
88. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277
(1988).
89. Home Insurance, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1395, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
90. Id. at 1392-96, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 280-82 (emphasis added).
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surance analysis, the first insurer on the loss bears the entire loss.
Possibly, the California Supreme Court will grant review over the
Home Insurance case and clarify this split in authority.
One additional complication may arise when two or more home-
owners have owned the property during the same three year period.
The first and second insurance companies insure the original home-
owner during which time property damage first manifests itself and
continues to progress. The house is sold, and immediately after,
damage is discovered and a claim is filed under the current home-
owner's policy. The threshold issue is whether the subject purchaser
or her carrier can assert a claim under the previous two policies,
assuming this involves no question of the assignability of rights by
the original homeowner after the policy expires and the house is
sold.91 Assuming the prior policy can be validly assigned, the final
carrier of three has a good argument to involve the original two
insurers in order to spread the risk of loss under the California
Union rationale.
Although there is now a split of authority, the California courts
may still extend the rationale of California Union to all risk home-
owner's policies and limit Home Insurance to its facts. The courts
would probably rely on the insurance cases recited above, as well as
Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.92 and Harman v. American
Casualty Co.93 The same rationale applies to a comprehensive general
liability policy. In California Union, the court held:
[U]nder the authority of Snapp, Harman, and United States Fidelity
& G. Co., we are constrained to hold that in a 'one occurrence'
case involving continuous, progressive and deteriorating damage,
the carrier in whose policy period the damage first becomes apparent
remains on the risk until the damage is finally and totally complete
94
In Snapp, the plaintiffs were insured for a term of three years
under a fire policy with an "all risk" endorsement. The plaintiff's
residence was built on fill which became saturated by unusually heavy
rainfall. The unstable land beneath the residence began to move,
causing structural and foundation damage. After finding coverage
for damage to the soil and foundation underneath the dwelling, the
91. See University of Judaism v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 937, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 907 (1976).
92. 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1962).
93. 155 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Cal. 1957).
94. California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 476, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
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court reversed the trial court's finding of no coverage. 95 The insurer's
obligation was not terminable on the date of expiration of the policy.96
The court held that to permit the insurer to terminate its liability
while the fortuitous peril during the policy term was still active would
not be in accord with precedents or with the common understanding
of the nature and purpose of insurance. 97 Termination would bestow
an injustice on the insured, defeating the very protection for which
premiums were paid.98
Once the event insured against occurs within the policy period, the
carrier remains liable. It is immaterial that the damage continues
beyond the policy period and thus cannot be fully determined. The
carrier's responsibility when damage occurs becomes a contract mat-
ter, rather than a contingency. The court found that State Farm was
required to pay its policy limits even though some of this award
resulted from damages after the policy terminated. 99 In Harman, the
court held that cancellation of a policy would not terminate liability
where a continuing loss had begun until the cause of the loss had
ceased. 00
In sum, once a continuing, progressive loss begins, each company
is on the risk until the damage ceases or is repaired.' 10 The insurers
are jointly and severally liable for not only the dwelling, but also
the underlying soils'02 supporting the property. 0 3 Furthermore, each
insurer will be liable under the language of the first policy issued to
the insured. 0 4 Because of the recent trend in the courts of finding
liability against insurers for subsidence losses, insurers have turned
95. Snapp, 206 Cal. App. 2d at 833, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
96. Id. at 831-32, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
97. Id. at 831, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
98. Id. at 831, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
99. Id. at 834, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 48. See also Cypress Grove Townhouse Project Comm.
v. Covenant Mutual Ins. Co., 197 Cal. App. 3d 169, 242 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1987) (Cypress Grove
has been depublished, see supra note 23.); Ash v. Safeco Ins. Co., 652 F. Supp. 148 (C.D.
Cal. 1986); Pfeiffer v. General Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
100. Harman v. American Casualty Co., 155 F. Supp. 612, 613 (S.D. Cal. 1957). See also
California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461
(1983).
101. California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d. 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
102. Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44
(1962); Pfeiffer v. General Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
103. Cypress Grove Townhouse Project Comm. v. Covenant Mutual Ins. Co., 197 Cal.
App. 3d 169, 242 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1987) (Cypress Grove has been ordered depublished, see
supra note 23) (the surrounding sand dunes protecting the project from waves were eroded by
rainstorms).
104. McKee v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 772, 193 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1983).
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to the technical notice policy provisions to avoid paying for the
damage incurred by the insureds.
IV. NOTICE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSES
Unlike a fire or burglary loss under a homeowner's/homeowner
association policy, first party claims relating to construction defects
may not be discoverable until years after the project's actual design
and construction. Most claims involve latent defects. The homeowner
has a maximum ten years (or four years for patent defects) from
substantial completion of the home to pursue a third party claim
against the developer, contractor or design professional, or three
years from the date 6f discovery.105 Furthermore, the loss may have
been discovered, the investigation undertaken, and repairs made by
the homeowner/association before discovering that coverage may be
afforded under the policy. Or the homeowner may have simply lived
with the condition for years, after manifestation, before recognizing
that he or she had a potential policy claim.
However, the insured may not be able to recover if she does not
notify the insurer of the loss, since every policy defines the respon-
sibility of the insured to notify the insurance company after a loss
has occurred. These obligations include, inter alia, giving immediate
written notice to the company and submitting a sworn proof of loss,
defining the damage and cost to repair or replace to the carrier,
within sixty days after requested.
Insurance policies also frequently contain a standard clause re-
quiring the insured to comply with all policy provisions before
bringing suit. That clause requires that any suit must be brought
within one year of the loss. The provision's reasonable interpretation
is one of creating certain conditions precedent to policy benefits and
promoting due diligence on the part of the insured to notify the
company. 106
The notice provisions are required by statute. The Standard Fire
Insurance Contract'07 enumerated by California Insurance Code sec-
tion 2071108 sets out the notice provisions as follows:
105. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 337.1, 337.15 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
106. See SA J. APPLEmA, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 3481 (1970 & Supp. 1988). See
also White v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 128 Cal. 131, 60 P. 66 (1900); Saccombe v. Glens Falls
Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 611, 188 P. 305 (1920).
107. The Standard Fire Insurance contract is the form used for the all-risk homeowners
policy. See CAL. INs. CODE § 2071 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988).
108. Id.
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Requirements in case loss occurs
The insured shall give written notice to this company of any loss
without unnecessary delay, protect the property from further dam-
age, forthwith separate the damaged and undamaged personal prop-
erty, put it in the best possible order, furnish a complete inventory
of the destroyed, damaged and undamaged property, showing in
detail quantities, costs, actual cash value and amount of loss claimed;
and within 60 days after the loss, unless such time is extended in
writing by this company, the insured shall render to this company
a proof of loss, signed and sworn to by the insured, stating the
knowledge and belief of the insured as to the following: .... The
insured, as often as may be reasonably required, shall exhibit to
any person designated by this company, and subscribe the same
Suit
No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall
be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the require-
ments of this policy shall have been complied' with, and unless
commenced within 12 months next after inception of the loss."09
Insurers and their homeowner's policies rarely, if ever, follow the
language of the Standard Fire Policy. Instead, they use more specific
and/or restrictive language. 110 This more specific restrictive language
may violate the Insurance Code.
California Insurance Code section 2079, entitled "Additional Per-
missive Clauses," allows only the following clauses to be added to
the Standard Fire Policy: Those clauses (a) covering subject matter
and risks not otherwise covered; (b) assuming greater liability than
is otherwise imposed on the insurer; (c) granting insured permits and
privileges not otherwise provided; (d) waiving any of the matters
which may be waived and which avoid the policy or suspend the
insurance; and (e) waiving any of the requirements imposed on the
insured after loss."'
Insurance Code section 2079 does not provide for more restrictive
or specific provisions. The Code only allows less restrictive provisions
and definitions. Thus, normal insurer conduct and drafting leads to
four possible alternatives. First, because the insurer has violated the
Insurance Code, the restrictive provisions are dropped from the
109. Id. Cf. supra note 15 (discussing the ISO Homeowners, HO-3 Edition, policy).
110. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the "Suit Against Us" provision).
111. CAL. INs. CoDE § 2079 (West 1972).
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policy, effectively waiving the insurer's right to use the notice pro-
visions as a policy defense. Second, the court could choose to drop
the insurers' more restrictive notice provisions and insert the section
2071 provisions in its place. Third, because the notice provisions do
not match the statutory policy exactly, they are facially ambiguous.
Ambiguities in insurance policies are interpreted against the drafter.
12
Finally, the insured would have a strong equitable estoppel or waiver
argument based on the aforementioned.1
3
The insurer could avoid such an interpretation by complying with
Insurance Code section 2080, which provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this Article, clauses imposing
specified duties and obligations upon the insured and limiting the
liability of the insurer may be attached to the standard form. Such
clauses shall be in the rider or riders attached to the standard form
of policy and shall be in type larger than pica or in capital letters
measuring not less than eight one-hundredths (8/100ths) of an inch
in height."1
4
The ISO HO-3 edition homeowners policy, used by most insurers,
fails to comply with section 2080 as far as the notice provisions are
concerned, leaving the policy language open to one of the four
previously mentioned attacks. Insurers always prefer more stringent,
restrictive or specific language, since it allows the insurer to deny
more claims on technical grounds. These issues and alternatives are
yet to be decided by the courts.
A. Late Notice and Prejudice
California cases hold that late notice will not bar recovery unless
the insurer has been prejudiced. The court in Associated Engineers,
Inc. v. American National Fire Insurance Co.,"5 held that where the
insured discovered the loss in December, 1957, made and completed
repairs to the broken sewer line in February, 1958, and gave notice
to the carrier in March, 1958, the insurer was not prejudiced." 6 The
112. See Admiralty Fund v. Peerlees Ins. Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 379, 382, 191 Cal. Rptr.
753, 756 (1983).
113. Id. See also infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
114. CAL. INS. CODE § 2080 (West 1972).
115. 175 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
116. Associated Eng'rs, 175 F. Supp. at 355. See also Abrams v. American Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 32 Cal. 2d 233, 195 P.2d 797 (1948); Purefoy v. Pacific Auto. Indem. Exch.,
5 Cal. 2d 81, 53 P.2d 155 (1955).
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notice provision in the policy at issue in Associated Engineers was
similar to the current sixty-day proof-of-loss provision, except that
the insured had ninety, not sixty, days to file his proof.1
7
In Moe v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co.,"" an action against
a title insurer by the purchasers of a note secured by a trust deed,
the court held:
It is settled that breach of a notice clause by an insured may not
be asserted by an insurer unless the insurer was substantially prej-
udiced thereby; that prejudice is not presumed as a matter of law
from such breach; and that the insurer has the burden of proving
actual prejudice and not just a mere possibility of prejudice." 9
Each case depends on its facts for a determination of prejudice.
20
The particular facts which might give rise to a carrier's prejudice
defense include unreasonable delay in notice so as to jeopardize the
insurer's subrogation rights. Since the insurer stands in the shoes of
the insured for purposes of subrogation, if the insured waits over
three years after discovery of damage to notify the carrier, the insurer
may be barred by the California Code of Civil Procedure section
338 three year statute of limitations.' 2 ' This would appear prejudicial
since the insurer's subrogation potential against the third party whose
negligence caused the damage to the home would evaporate. Simi-
larly, if the insured waited a year after knowledge of the loss to
notify the carrier, thereby permitting the ten-year statute of limita-
tions for filing a claim against the developer'2 to run, a good
argument of prejudice can be asserted.
In many instances, unlike a fire or theft loss, the insured is ignorant
that property damage coverage under her homeowner's policy is
available for latent defects. It is this lack of knowledge which often
precipitates late notice. However, ignorance does not excuse the
insured from filing a claim immediately after the loss is discovered.
Prejudice may also result if the insured makes exterior property
repairs without first obtaining expert opinions on the cause of the
loss and appropriate methods of reasonable repair, thereby spending
117. See Associated Eng'rs, 175 F. Supp. at 354.
118. 21 Cal. App. 3d 289, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971).
119. Moe, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 302, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 555 (citations omitted).
120. See Reed v. Pacific Indem. Co., 101 Cal. App. 2d 151, 255 P.2d 255 (1950); Gibson
v. Colonial Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 33, 206 P.2d 387 (1949); Abrams, 32 Cal. 2d 233, 195
P.2d 797 (1948).
121. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338 (Vest 1979).
122. Id. § 337.15 (or four years if the defect is patent).
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hundreds or thousands of dollars more on repairs which are ineffec-
tive, useless or need to be redone.
Similarly, the leading case of Hickman v. London Assurance
Corp. 123 states:
As the facts with respect to the amount and circumstances of a loss
are almost entirely within the sole knowledge of the insured, and
the opportunity and temptation to perpetuate a fraud upon the
insurer is often great, it is necessary that it have some means of
cross-examining, as it were, upon the written statement and proofs
of the insured for the purpose of getting the exact facts before
paying the sum claimed of it. Such conditions justify the provision
universally to be met within policies, requiring the insured as often
as demanded to submit to an examination under oath touching all
matters material to the adjustment of the loss, and provisions of
that character are held to be reasonable and valid.1
2
A
However, in a continuing and progressive damage situation such
as earth movement, property damages may occur after the date of
first manifestation and may, arguably be grounds for disposing of a
prejudice argument particularly when the insured has not added to
the damages. Often damage continues beneath the home for years
prior to the time it manifests itself into noticable physical damage
to the home. Certainly, the insured cannot prejudice the insurer's
rights until the insured himself is aware he has a claim.
B. When Does the Statute Begin to Run? Discovery of the Loss
Putting possible prejudice aside, it must be determined when the
loss "began" for purposes of the various statute of limitations
defenses used by the insurer in a continuing subsidence loss claim
(the notice defenses).12 This topic has been one of heated debate and
is currently widely litigated in the courts. The insurer argues that the
first time a crack in any portion of the home appears, the statutes
begin to run. 26 The insured argues that the statutes do not begin to
run until the manifestation of the damage and its cause or causes
are discoverable.
123. 184 Cal. 524, 195 P. 45 (1920).
124. Hickman, 184 Cal. at 529-30, 195 P. at 48 (citations omitted).
125. This article is concerned solely with (1) twelve-month "suit against us," (2) twelve-
month "notice of loss," (3) sixty-day proof of loss, and (4) four-year breach of contract
(California Civil Code section 337) provisions.
126. For the insurer's view, see Zalma, An Effective Defense to Claims of Continuing and
Progressive First-Party Property Losses, DAmY J. REP. 8 (1987).
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The controversy was discussed in Leaf v. City of San Mateo.127
There, the homeowners brought an action for subsidence damages
resulting from defective sewage and drainage systems. 12 The court
reasoned:
Defendant in this action takes the position that plaintiffs' cause of
action accrued when plaintiffs became aware of the damage to their
property, i.e., when they noticed the unlevel floors and cracks in
the building exterior. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, urge the "rule
of discovery," which would start a statute running only when
plaintiffs not only were aware of the damage, but became aware
of its negligent cause, i.e., at the time of the cave-in.
Although it has been said that a cause of action under the discovery
rule accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered
all facts essential to his cause of action, this has been interpreted
under the discovery rule to be when 'plaintiff either (1) actually
discovered his injury and its negligent cause or (2) could have
discovered injury and cause through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.' The discovery rule operates to protect the plaintiff who
is 'blamelessly ignorant' of his cause of action. Accordingly, we do
not think that plaintiffs' cause of action in this case should accrue
from the occurrence of the last essential fact, nor from discovery
of the damage to their property, as defendant contends, but rather
from the point in time when plaintiffs became aware of defendants'
negligence as a cause, or could have become so aware through the
exercise of reasonable diligence.
29
But in Matsumoto v. Republic Insurance Co.,t ° the court dismissed
an insured's earth movement/third party negligence claim since the
four-year statute of limitations for breach of contract was not tolled
by the discovery rule.' 3 ' The Matsumoto case, however, is an anomaly
and easily limited to its facts. There, the subsidence at plaintiff's
home was severe enough to make a backyard fence fall over. At that
time, plaintiff sought advise from his lawyer and discovered that
several of his neighbors had suffered similar damage to their homes
and made insurance claims to their carriers. Still, Matsumoto waited
several years before filing his claim with his carrier.
127. 104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1980).
128. Leaf, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
129. Id. at 406-08, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16 (citations omitted).
130. 792 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1986).
131. Matsumoto, 792 F.2d at 872.
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The Matsumoto decision is highly criticized in the detailed, but
decertified, opinion of Paul v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
132
There, the court allowed a delay of over four years from the point
in which Paul's insurance agent denied his earth movement claim
without investigation.
133
Properly applying the "date-of-discovery" rule, the court reversed
the trial court's ruling sustaining defendants' demurrer on the theory
that defendants' fraudulent concealment, breach of fiduciary duties
and estoppel preclude them from utilizing the four-year statute by
backdating the date of loss.134 Until the claimant has knowlege of
the loss, and its negligent cause, the loss is not "discovered" for
purposes of the notice defenses.
Two other recent cases have dealt with the applicability of the
twelve month notice provisions.135 In Lawrence v. Western Mutual
Insurance Co.,y 6 Lawrence, in 1968, built a home on a vacant lot
in Bel Air, California. In 1974 and 1975, Lawrence suffered subsi-
dence damage to his home. Geological studies done at that time
showed that faulty drainage was the cause of the damage.
No further damage occurred until 1983, when heavy rains infil-
trated the home's underlying soils. Soils reports were again obtained
in 1983, concluding that the home was built on 36 feet of improperly
compacted fill material. Lawrence spent over $250,000 on geological
studies and reconstruction of the foundation. Not until July 15, 1985
did Lawrence file a claim with his insurer.
132. 193 Cal. App. 3d 223, 238 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1987) (Pursuant to California Rules of
Court sections 976(b) and 976.1, the California Supreme Court has ordered the Paul opinion
depublished. As a result this case cannot be cited as authority in California courts.).
133. Paul, 193 Cal. App. at 237, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
134. Id. The date of discovery rule has been applied in numerous circumstances. See, e.g.
Pacific-Southern Mortgage Trust Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Amer., 166 Cal. App. 3d 703,
212 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1985) (the term 'discovery of loss'-under a commercial blanket bond-
meant the time when the insured discovered it had suffered a loss, and not the time when it
discovered it had a potential loss that began the running of the limitations period); Allen v.
Sundean, 137 Cal. App. 3d 216, 186 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1982) (latent construction defects on
home built in 1950s with improper fill; court rejected developer's statute of limitations defense
because of homeowner's ignorance of the improper hillside fill); Anderson v. Brouwer, 99
Cal. App. 3d 176, 160 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1979) (latent construction defects) But see Bellman v.
County of Contra Costa, 54 Cal. 2d 363, 353 P.2d 300, 5 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1960) (a new and
separate cause of action arises with each new subsidence, with any applicable limitations statute
running separately for each separate subsidence).
135. See Lawrence v. Western Mutual Ins. Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1988); Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 530, 252 Cal. Rptr.
565 (1988). The California Supreme Court has not yet determined whether or not to grant
review on either case. Thus, we must wait to see if either case will remain publishable precedent.
136. 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1988).
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Lawrence urged that the "inception of the loss" is not the point
when the damage is discovered, but rather when the insured knew
or should have known that a loss has occurred which is covered by
his insurance policy. 37 The court rightly disagreed with Lawrence
that the notice provisions (twelve month and sixty day proof of loss)
are not tolled until the insured is aware of a potential claim, but the
occurrence of some cognizable event which would lead a reasonable
person to discover the loss. 38 The Lawrence court further noted that
the insurer was prejudiced by the delay since Lawrence had completed
repairs before making his claim and not allowed the insurer the
opportunity to investigate.1
39
In Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,'40 the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's second amended
complaint following State Farm's demurrer.1 41 In Abari, plaintiff pled
that he discovered cracks in 1979, which progressively worsened over
time. 42 In 1984, when Abari returned to his home (he had rented it
to a third-party for 4 years), he noticed that the cracks had wors-
ened.143 Abari filed his claim with State Farm in early 1985 . 44
Upon review of the short Abari opinion, it seems that the court
was looking for a way to allow Abari to continue his case against
State Farm, but the complaint was simply too poorly pled. The court
stated:
Abari submits the trial court should have rejected State Farm's
argument that the cracks in 1979 put Abari on notice of subsidence.
Abari urges on appeal the cracks may have been so small that no
reasonable person would be put on notice of a subsidence problem.
It is conceivable the cracks were trivial, so that Abari was not
alerted to the gravity of the damage. However, the complaint lacks
such an allegation. As set forth ante, Abari merely pled he discov-
ered the cracks in 1979; the cracks worsened over time; and upon
reentering the property in 1984, after being an absentee landlord,
he observed further damage.
The subject complaint was Abari's third attempt to state a cause
of action against State Farm. In the earlier demurrers, State Farm
137. Lawrence, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 571-72, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
138. Id. at 573, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
139. Id. at 574, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
140. 205 Cal. App. 3d 530, 252 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1988).
141. Abari, 205 Cal. App.3d at 536, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
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called attention to Abari's failure to plead when damage arose.
Abari had ample opportunity to plead his best case, as nearly two
and one half years elapsed between the initial and second amended
complaints. 1
45
Neither Lawrence nor Abari discussed Leaf v. San Mateo. 46 How-
ever, these authorities, all good law at this point, are not inconsistent.
Leaf restates the adage that the "discovery of the loss" occurs when
the claimant knows or should know that there is a loss and its
negligent cause. 47 In both Lawrence and Abari, the plaintiffs knew
that they had a loss in 1975 and 1979, respectively, and were cognizant
of the cause of the loss at that time. Consequently, it would seem
that the courts are willing to look at subsidence losses, at least those
in which the notice provisions have been asserted as a defense, on a
case-by-case basis.
C. The Validity of the Notice Defenses
The date on which the loss began for statute of limitations purposes
is vital when discussing the notice defenses. Preliminarily, the policy
defenses may fail if the insured is not formally made aware of the
defenses' existence' 48 or if the policy language is ambiguous. 49 The
notice defenses can also be defeated under a theory of waiver or
estoppel. During the claim investigation, if the insurer fails to reserve
its rights or denies the claim based on the notice defenses, those
defenses are waived. 50 Furthermore, "one cannot justify or equitably
lull his adversary into a false sense of security, and thereby cause him
to subject his claim to the bar of the statute of limitations, and then
be permitted to plead the very delay caused by his conduct as a defense
to the action when brought." ' Hopefully, the tremendous amount of
litigation regarding the notice defenses presently pending in the Cali-
145. Id. at 535, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
146. 104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1980).
147. Leaf, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 408, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
148. See Sarchett v. Blue Shield, 43 Cal. 3d 1, 729 P.2d 267, 233 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1987).
149. Delgado v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 262, 271, 203 Cal. Rptr. 672,
677 (1984).
150. See Wagner v. Director, 658 F. Supp. 1530, 1538 (C.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 847 F.2d. 515 (9th Cir. 1988). But see Becker v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
664 F. Supp 460, 461-62 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (twelve-month limitation is not waived if insured
notifies insurer twelve months after the loss, despite the fact that insurer failed to reserve its
rights when denying insured's claim).
151. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 115 Cal. App. 2d 684, 252
P.2d 649, 689, 252 P.2d 649, 654 (1953).
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fornia courts will force the Supreme Court to resolve these issues.
Each homeowner's policy requires a sworn proof of loss to be filed
within sixty days of the loss. However, "it is not possible to prepare
a proof of loss until a complete inspection of the damage may be
accomplished and the full extent of the loss thereby ascertained.'" 15 2
In a subsidence case, then, a proof of loss could not be completed
until a geologist or soils engineer performs phase one or phase two
(if necessary) soils investigations and a contractor prepares a repair
bid. At that point, the sixty days would begin to run.
The twelve-month policy limitation itself has passed constitutional
muster,153 and one court has said it is unambiguous.5  As shown by
the discussion of Leaf, Lawrence, Paul, Abari, and Matsumoto, the
applicability of the twelve-month limitation, at present, is a question
of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis. As extensive litigation
on this point continues, hopefully the Supreme Court will resolve the
twelve-month applicability issue within the next few years.
Zurn Engineers v. Eagle Star Insurance Co.155 sheds light on how
the twelve-month provisions should be viewed:
[t]he phrase 'inception of the loss' must be construed in light of the
other provisions of the policy, and that so construed in the context
of the policy . .. the phrase does not mean the time at which the
physical event causing damage to property occurred. Rather, it must
be construed as occurring no earlier than the point at which the
insured's reasonable belief of the third party's responsibility for the
loss by reason of an uninsured case is countered by the third party's
assertion that it is not responsible.
[i]f the right to sue upon an insurance policy is postponed by action
that must be taken by the insured as a prerequisite to suit, the
limitation period does not commence to run until the insured has an
opportunity to comply with the conditions precedent to litigation.5 6
Under Zurn, it would seem that the twelve-month policy defenses
would be tolled until the insured has the opportunity to, for example,
make her claim, investigate to determine damages, and file a proof
of loss-all before the twelve-month policy defenses begin to run.
152. Associated Eng'rs Inc. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 352 (1959).
153. C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 211 Cal. Rptr. 765
(1985).
154. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
155. 61 Cal. App. 3d 493, 132 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1976). This case is discussed at length in
Lawrence v. western Mutual Ins. Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1988).
156. Zurn at 495, 499, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 207, 210.
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V. CONCLUSION
A continuous, progressive subsidence loss which began prior to
1983 and which was proximately caused by an excluded peril (such
as earth movement or flood) in conjunction with a non-excluded
peril (such as third party negligence) is covered under the HO-3
Edition ISO "all risk" homeowner's policy. Each insurer who was
on the risk prior to 1983 (when the policies were amended to exclude
third party negligence) must share, pro rata, the costs to repair both
the dwelling and the underlying or surrounding soils. For the most
part, when the insurer cannot show prejudice, the statute of limita-
tions defenses will be ineffective unless the insured had "discovered"
her loss and has slept on her rights. Discovery of the loss includes
knowing both the damage and its cause before the statutes begin to
run. Technical defenses, which are disfavored, such as the sixty-day
proof of loss requirement, cannot begin to run in a subsidence case
until an investigation is completed and the damages are known.
Finally, unless specifically reserved and explained, the policy defenses
may be held invalid under the theory of waiver or estoppel, may be
held to be ambiguous or may be re-written by the court. Due to the
tremendous amount of subsidence litigation and the uncertainty cre-
ated by the lack of definitive precedents, it is hoped that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court will provide guidance on these issues by
rendering a decision on Garvey in the near future and by granting
review on a case like Lawrence, Abari or Home Insurance to rule
on the notice issues.

